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A. THE CLASSIFICATION OF ROMAN LAW – PUBLIC LAW (IUS 
PUBLICUM) AND PRIVATE LAW (IUS PRIVATUM) – IN THE 
CLASSICAL PERIOD
From the beginning of the imperial period, the legal system of the 
Roman Empire (Reichsrecht) shows certain signs of differentiation, and 
it could be divided into ius publicum and ius privatum rather than civil 
law and praetorian law. The designation publicus-privatus (meaning 
public and private [spheres]) existed as early as the late republican 
period. The appearance of ius publicum and ius privatum as categories of 
classification can only be demonstrated with certainty at the beginning 
of the era of the principate.
The jurisconsult Ulpianus says the area governed by ius publicum is as 
follows: “Public law covers religious affairs, the priesthood, and offices of 
state.”(“Publicum ius in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit.” 
[D. 1, 1, 1, 2]). According to the definition given by Ulpianus in the Digest 
of emperor Justinianus Ist (527-565), Roman public law (ius publicum) 
regulates the organization of the state, and that included ecclesiastic 
organization. Questions of private life, i.e., relationships of citizens in 
the family and in business were therefore regulated by Roman private 
law (ius privatum).
   Late classical and post-classical jurisprudence separated ius publicum 
from ius privatum with the introduction of the terms “public interest” 
(utilitas publica) and “private interest” (utilitas privata). This has been 
derived from a statement by Ulpianus:
There are two branches of legal study: public and private law. Public law 
is that which respects the establishment of the Roman commonwealth, 
private that which respects individuals’ interests, some matters being of 
public and others of private interest.” (“Huius studii duae sunt positiones, 
publicum et privatum. publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, 
privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem: sunt enim quaedam publice 
utilia, quaedam privatim.” [D. 1, 1, 1, 2]).1 
The major part of the relevant literature2 says these two “branches 
of law” existed throughout the whole era of the principate and of the 
dominate. However, some legal scholars state that the Roman jurists 
only used the terms ius publicum–ius privatum to describe the two 
areas of legal science or jurisprudence (jurisprudentia). According to 
the latter point of view, we cannot speak about the division of Roman 
law into two branches. Note that even in the above passage of Ulpianus 
the term studium and not ius is used.
Occasionally public law may cover both the organization of the state 
and private matters. The jurisconsult Papinianus says that making a 
will is a legal institution (Rechtsinstitut) regulated by public law (D. 28, 
1, 3). To this dual division of Roman law belongs the following thesis 
of Papinianus: “Public law cannot be changed by private pacts.” (“Ius 
publicum privatorum pactis mutari non potest” [D. 2, 14, 38]). Hence 
it follows that a rule of law may either be compulsory (ius cogens) or 
concessive (ius dispositivum). The latter shall apply if the parties have 
not agreed otherwise. The rules of public law are of a compulsory 
character, e.g. the rules of elections. The rules of private law, on the 
other hand, are concessive, e.g. the provisions of the law of contract 
(leges contractus). It is true, however, that some of the rules of private 
law are of a compulsory nature, e.g. the age limit of adulthood or the 
rules limiting the rate of interest.
In accordance with some sources, certain norms of ius privatum may 
not be changed similarly to those of ius publicum. On the topic of 
adverse possession (usucapio) one passage in the Digest, authored 
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by jurisconsult Paulus, provides an Edictum commentary making a 
reference to Pomponius. (“Quod opere facto consecutus sit dominii capione 
promissor, non teneri eum eo nomine Pomponius ait, quia nec loci nec 
operis vitio, sed publico iure id consecutus sit” [D. 39, 2, 18, 1]). When 
writing about manumission of slaves (manumissio servi or servorum), 
Papinianus refers to the invariable nature of ius privatum (“Cerdonem 
servum meum manumitti volo ita, ut operas heredi promittat. non cogitur 
manumissus promittere: sed etsi promiserit, in eum actio non dabitur: 
nam iuri publico derogare non potuit, qui fideicommissariam libertatem 
dedit” [D. 38, 1, 42]). Ulpianus describes the invariable character of the 
rules of private law in connection with the provisions of guardianship 
(tutela) (“Patronus quoque tutor liberti sui fidem exhibere debet, et si 
qua in fraudem debitorum quamvis pupilli liberti gesta sunt, revocari ius 
publicum permittit” [D. 26, 1, 8]). In the area of making a testament, 
the prohibition of free stipulations of private persons shall also apply. 
Papinianus iustifies the prohibition related to the testamenti factio by 
saying that in this domain ius publicum applies (“Testamenti factio non 
privati, sed publici juris est” [D. 28, 1, 3]).
In our view Ulpianus’ distinction (“Huius studii duae sunt positiones…”) 
is not of a technical nature, it is rather a form of general classification. 
It has its roots in Greek thought. This opinion was pointed out by H. F. 
Jolowicz, author of Roman Foundations of Modern Law, published in 
1957, a treatise of significance still in our days.3 
Although it is merely a description (descriptio) and not a definition 
(definitio), nevertheless it is adequate for the realities of the Roman 
legal system. A good example from substantive law is the acquisition of 
ownership. If the party concerned is the state (res publica), the acquisition 
of ownership is different from the one in the case of private persons, 
that is, Roman citizens (cives Romani). It is also important to underline 
that in case of acquiring ownership from the state neither mancipatio 
nor traditio is necessary. Quoting an example from procedural rules, 
a dispute can be taken between the state and a citizen which will be 
tried outside of the so-called ordinary private procedure. This specific 
character is also clear from the missing formula and the fact that the 
decision (sententia) is made – both in theory and in practice – by a 
person who defends the interest of the state (iudex).
The main reason for the lack of separation or distinction between 
the areas of public law (ius publicum) and private law (ius privatum) is 
that Romans in general, and Roman jurists in particular, showed little 
interest in either abstract academic theories or definitions.
It is worth observing from the point of view of our topic the following 
source by Ulpianus: “Private law is tripartite, being derived from principles 
of ius naturale, ius gentium, or ius civile.” (“Privatum ius tripertitum est: 
collectum etenim est ex naturalibus praeceptis aut gentium aut civilibus”). 
(D. 1, 1, 1, 2). It is not easy to establish the exact meaning of this 
description about the division of private law (ius privatum). It is highly 
questionable what motivated Ulpianus to make that statement. It is 
most likely that it was not his purpose to define subdivisions of private 
law (ius privatum).
The following interpretation of ius civile originating from Pomponius 
is important also from the view of the subdivision of the legal system. 
According to Pomponius, ius civile is equal to the law “…which is 
grounded without formal writing in nothing more than interpretation by 
learned jurists…” (“…quod sine scripto in sola prudentium interpretatione 
consistit…”) (D. 1, 2, 2, 12). In this statement about ius civile as put 
forward by Pomponius there is some kind of similarity to the distinction 
between positive law (ius positivum) and statute law (statutory law) 
conceived in modern legal systems. The interpretation by Pomponius 
of ius civile does not contain any idea of subdivision. In our view this is 
attributable also to the fact that the term ius civile can be interpreted 
in a number of ways, i.e. it can be the subject of a kind of interpretatio 
multiplex.
Marcus Tullius Cicero’s statement has also great significance from 
the point of view of the division of ius civile. In Cicero’s opinion “…ius 
civile, quod nunc diffusum et dissipatum esset, in certa genera coacturum 
et ad artem facilem redacturum.” (De oratore 2. 33. 142.). The question is 
what does Cicero mean by in certa genera division, or, to be even more 
accurate, what does genus mean to him? In our view, the outstanding 
orator, philosopher and statesman, who had profound knowledge of 
law as well, used the terminology of Greek logic, metaphysics, geometry 
and grammar when he made an attempt to interpret ius civile and to 
describe the law applicable to Roman citizens.4 Again what we have here 
is by no means an attempt to classify ius civile. It is simply a description 
(descriptio).5 
B. CIVIL LAW (IUS CIVILE) AND PRAETORIAN LAW (IUS 
PRAETORIUM-IUS HONORARIUM) IN THE POST-CLASSICAL 
PERIOD
The distinction between civil law (ius civile) and praetorian law (ius 
praetorium) – the original division between archaic and ‘developed’ law 
– had practically disappeared by the end of the first century B.C. Yet the 
classical jurisconsults made a distinction between civil law and praetorian 
law and their institutions. As a result of a gradual amalgamation, the 
rules of praetorian law are more and more closely connected to those 
of civil law (ius civile). In the classical period the difference between 
the two streams of the already merged law remained only in terms 
of their source. Civil law originated from the legislative authorities 
(popular assembly, senatus, the emperor, the jurists provided with ius 
respondendi) of the state (res publica), whereas praetorian law came 
from magistrates (praetor, aedilis curulis, proconsul of provinces), who 
had no formal powers to legislate.
The fusion of civil law and praetorian law or “magistrates’ law” (ius 
honorarium) is described by the jurisconsult Marcianus. As he put it: 
“For indeed the ius honorarium itself is the living voice of the ius civile.” 
(“Nam et ipsum ius honorarium viva vox est iuris civilis” [D. 1, 1, 8]). For 
Marcianus ius honorarium is a kind of law that is created in the first place 
by office holders i.e. magistrates (magistratus), mainly by praetors.
Ius civile means the body of law as crystallized in the works of the 
Roman jurisconsults or, to use a modern term, jurisprudence as well. 
Law as applied in daily life can be studied best (in addition to the law 
contained in the decrees of emperors [constitutiones, edicta, called 
also leges]) – on the basis of ius civile. Ius civile can be considered as 
a synonym for private law (ius privatum). The reason for it is that the 
major part of law as formed and interpreted by the Roman jurists is 
made up of civil law (ius privatum). Ius civile cannot be considered as a 
1Regarding the interpretation of the text of Ulpianus, see A. Földi & G. Hamza, A római 
jog története és institúciói. [History and Institutes of Roman Law] (2015), at 51.
2For a summary of earlier works, see E. Betti, Diritto romano. I. (1935), at 62 et seq.
3H.F. Jolowicz, Public Law and Private Law, in H. F. Jolowicz, Lectures on Jurisprudence 
(1963) at 320-327.
4Cicero provides a detailed discussion about the questions of res publica (in a modern 
sense, the state) in his work The State (De re publica). In this dialogue (which only 
survived in fragments) Cicero analyses the state and numerous institutions of (public) 
law. The author of this article translated The State into Hungarian. The volume 
includes his introductory essay and notes. Somnium Scipionis has been translated 
by L. Havas. (Budapest, 1995, third reprint, 2007).
5We cannot rule out the possibility that Cicero adhered to the idea of preserving the 
unity of the legal system as motivated by his view about ius naturale. See A. D’Amato, 
Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 American Journal of Jurisprudence 
(1981) at 202.
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branch of law. In this context it is worth emphasising that ius honorarium 
and ius praetorium, which do not qualify as a branch of law either, are 
bound to lose their reforming effect on civil law. The distinction based 
on the dual categories ius civile and ius praetorium (ius honorarium) is 
gradually replaced by the distinction between public law (ius publicum) 
and private law (ius privatum).
The idea of the division of the legal system – which is different from 
splitting the legal system into branches – goes back to Greek and 
Hellenistic antecedents. It applies to the appearance of the paired 
categories of ius civile and ius praetorium as well as in the division of 
ius publicum and ius privatum. The distinction made by distinguished 
representatives of Greek philosophy and rhetoric – first of all, Aristotle 
and Demosthenes – forms the basis for the distinction used for the 
classification of law or legal system appearing in the works of Roman 
jurisconsults.
C. THE QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
THE WORK OF THE GLOSSATORS
The question of classification of the legal system occurs already in 
the work of some representatives of the Glossator School, initiated 
by Irnerius6 in the beginning of the medieval science of law.7 In this 
context the famous dispute (disputa)8 between the notable jurisconsult, 
Placentinus9 (d. 1192), a follower of Bulgarus, and Azo Portius10 (d. 
1230) is of outstanding significance. According to Placentinus, who 
was the first to formulate the idea of the division (dichotomy) of the 
system of law (ordo juris) into branches: ius publicum and ius privatum, 
it must be considered “duae res,” i.e. existing categories. Consequently, 
these two categories form two independent, autonomous subjects 
of studium juris. Contrary to that approach Azo Portius,11 who insisted 
on maintaining the unity of the legal system, refused the thesis of 
diversitas rerum vel personarum and considered the distinction between 
ius publicum and ius privatum to be merely an issue of methodology. 
In the opinion of Azo, the distinction between the above categories 
is of a relative nature, consequently, it is always necessary to add the 
word ”principaliter” when distinguishing between them.12 
The rejection on a theoretical level of the classification of the legal 
system by Roman jurisconsults13 did not preclude the development of 
public law. This is why the claim made by some of the representatives 
of the German Pandectist School is incorrect which says that jurists of 
private law were insensitive towards the problems and questions of 
public life. It should be underlined in this context that the last three 
volumes of the Codex Iustinianus, called Tres libri (Tres libri Codicis), 
contained exclusively public law rules that came into the focus of 
interest of the notable representatives of the Bolognese School, 
called Glossators.14 It was an outstanding student of the Bolognese 
School, Andrea Bonello da Barletta (approx. 1190-1273), professor 
at the University of Naples, who wrote a commentary to the Tres 
libri. This Studium (Generale), founded by Emperor Frederick II in 1224, 
was the first state university in Europe. In our opinion it cannot be a 
coincidence that the outstanding interest shown in the committed 
study of ius publicum occurred at this particular state university, where 
the education – using a modern term – of state office holders was 
a priority. The commentary of Bonello da Barletta as a genre stood 
between the glossa and summa.
Liber constitutionum, passed by the Parliament of Melfi in 1231, is a 
significant source also from the point of view of the classification of 
the legal system. This work can be regarded as the most significant one 
dealing with the question of ius proprium in that era. Liber constitutionum 
deals with real legal questions of its time (quaestiones de facto) instead 
of simply describing ius commune. It also addressed the problem of 
the classification of law i.e., the legal system.
The glossa, written by the notable jurisconsult Marino da Caramanico 
between 1270 and 1280, is also worth mentioning. Its author followed 
the example provided by the Glossa ordinaria of Accursius. In this work 
the author used the method of Accursius15 in which the questions of 
the classification of law (legal system) also play a role.
D. THE QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
THE WORK OF THE COMMENTATORS
From the point of view of the classification of the legal system, the 
oeuvre of Bartolus de Saxoferrato16 (1313-1357) is outstanding. He wrote 
comments on all parts of Iustinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis.17 He is writing 
about several questions in his commentaries that are connected to 
public law. His attention was focused on the – even legally problematic 
–relationship of secular and ecclesiastical power, imperium and sacerdotium. 
Bartolus is the author of the following works on public law: Tractatus 
repraesaliarum, Tractatus de Guelphis et Ghibellinis, Tractatus de tyrannia, 
Tractatus de regimine civitatis, Tractatus de statutis and Tractatus de insignis 
et armis. In the tractatus listed above Bartolus dwells on important 
problems of public law: among other issues, the relationship between 
secular and ecclesiastical power, between imperium and sacerdotium, 
as well as the relationship between the sovereign (king or emperor) 
and their subjects.
We have to mention here that the same topics were of high importance 
in works by St. Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Marsilio da Padova and Coluccio 
Salutati. Baldus (1327-1400) also wrote commentaries on the Tres libri. The 
most extensive commentary on the Tres libri has been written by Luca da 
Penne (1343-1382). We have to mention here that, according to Friedrich 
Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), besides Bartolus in the 14th century, the 
most outstanding expert of public law and at the same time a notable 
European scholar of jurisprudence, scientia legum, is Luca da Penne.
E. THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
HUMANIST JURISPRUDENCE
The question of the classification of the legal system kept occupied the 
minds of most of the representatives of Humanist jurisprudence.18 In the 
16th and 17th centuries we come across the principle of ius universum 
in the work of most of these authors. The title of one of Jean Bodin’s 
(1529/30-1596) works, Juris universi distributio, the first edition (editio 
princeps) of which was published in 1578, is of outstanding significance. 
Representatives of the Humanist jurisprudence – though examining the 
legal system in its unity and entirety – dealt also with the classification 
of ordo juris, also called systema juris. Such classification has its roots 
in Greek and Roman tradition. Their approach to classification of the 
legal system is infl uenced undoubtedly to a considerable extent by 
their education in classical studies.
Bodin himself refers to the system of Iustinian’s Institutiones several times. 
He criticizes the system of the Institutiones stating that its acceptance 
would result in dividing the legal system into branches, which in his 
view is not desirable. 
One of the tendencies in Humanist jurisprudence advocated the ideal 
of law as proposed by Cicero. The representatives of that school state that 
law, as a form of ars, forms an organic whole, and it is created by the state. 
The creation of law therefore is inseparably connected to the sovereignty 
of the state. That view can be demonstrated, in addition to Bodin, by 
works of Guillaume Budé (Budaeus), (1467/68-1540)19 François Connan 
(Connanus) (1508-1551),20 François Le Daren (Duarenus) (1509-1559), 
6For the connection between state and law in Irnerius’s approach, see A. Rota, Lo 
stato e il diritto nella concezione di Irnerio (1959).
7For the significance of the Glossator school, see H. Fitting, Die Anfänge der Rechtsschule 
zu Bologna (1888); E. Besta, L’opera d’Irnerio (1896); P.S. Leicht, Il diritto privato 
preirneriano (1933); P. Torelli, “La codificazione e la glossa, questioni e propositi, in Atti 
congresso Internazionale di diritto romano  (1934) at 329 et seq.; B. Brugi, Il metodo 
dei glossatori bolognesi, in Studi in onore di S. Riccobono I. (1936) at 21-31. ; W. 
Engelmann, Die Wiedergeburt der Rechtskultur in Italien durch die wissenschaftliche 
Lehre (1938); H.U. Kantorowicz, Studies in the Glossators of Roman Law (1938); F. 
Calasso, Medioevo del diritto I. Le fonti (1954); P. Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval 
Europe 1961)3; P. Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht. Munich – Berlin, 
19664; E.J.H. Schrage, Utrumque ius. Eine Einführung in das Studium der Quellen 
des mittelalterlichen gelehrten Rechts (1992); J. M. Sainz-Ezquerra, La glosa y el 
texto jurídico, un análisis de historia y método, in Estudios F. Hernández-Tejero. II 
(1994) at 505; G. Hamza, Accursius és az európai jogtudomány kezdetei, [Accursius 
and the Beginnings of European Jurisprudence], 54 Jogtudományi Közlöny  (1999) 
at 171-175; M. Ascheri, I diritti del medioevo italiano, Secoli XI–XV (2000).
8For the connection between law (private law) and public law in the approach of 
Azo, see J. W. Perrin, Azo, Roman Law and Sovereign European States, 15 Studia 
Gratiana  (1972) at 89-101.
9For a Hungarian commentary on Placentinus, see G. Hamza, Az európai magánjog 
fejlődése. A modern magánjogi rendszerek kialakulása a római jogi hagyományok 
alapján [Trends in the Development of Private Law in Europe. The Role of the 
Civilian Tradition in the Shaping of Modern Systems of Private Law] (2002), at 56; 
idem, Entstehung und Entwicklung der modernen Privatrechtsordnungen und 
die römischrechtliche Tradition (2009) at 82-83; idem, Origine e sviluppo degli 
ordinamenti giusprivatistici moderni in base alla tradizione del diritto romano 
(2013) at 83.
10The exceptional prestige of Azo can be illustrated by a late-medieval saying, Chi 
non ha Azo, non vada a palazzo.
11Let us stress that Azo is the author of Summa Codicis, an analysis on Codex Iustinianus 
(also known as Summa super Codicem), which was used as an indispensable 
handbook of legal practice for a long time.
12On how the general legal principles appear in the works of Glossators and Commentators, 
see P. Stein, Principi generali nel pensiero dei glossatori e commentatori medievali, 
in Principi generali del diritto. Atti dei convegni Lincei 96, (1992) at 129.
13Pomponius wrote, “quod sine ullo scripto in sola prudentium interpretatione consistit”, 
D. 1, 2, 2, 12. Interpretatio in this case does not involve a clear distinction. That 
sheds light on the empirical phase of ius civile. (For the definition of interpretatio 
in the latest Hungarian literature, see T. Nótári, Summum ius summa iniuria - 
Comments on the Historical Background of a Legal Maxim of Interpretation, 44 
Acta Juridica Hungarica  (2004) at 301-321.
14We have to mention here that Irnerius in his glossae took into consideration the 
entire codification of Iustinian (Corpus Juris Civilis). He gave no glossae to Tres 
libri (Tres libri Codicis), however, because he probably was not aware of them. 
Thus there was no way for Irnerius to write glossae on public law.
15For the career of Accursius, see E. Genzmer, Zur Lebensgeschichte des Accursius, 
in Festschrift für L. Wenger. II. 223-241 (1945), and F. Camacho, A propósito del VII 
centenario de la muerte de Acursio, 3 Anales Cátedra Francisco Suárez 131 (1963). 
See also A. Garcia Y Garcia, Accurse et Jacques Balduin, 29 Studia Gratiani  (1988) at 
795-814 and A. Fernandez De Bujan, Sistemática y ius civile en las obras de Quintus 
Mucius Scaevola y de Acursio, 34 Revista Jurídica  e Navarra  (2002) at 57-80.
16For Bartolus from earlier literature, see W. Rattingan, Bartolus, in Sir J. Macdonell 
история государства и Праваистория государства и Права
and E. Manson (Eds.), Great Jurists of the World. (1914; reprint 1997), at 45-57. 
From recent literature, see Bartolo da Sassoferrato, Studi e documenti per il VI 
centenario. I-II (1962).
17For the significance of the Commentators, see M. Smith, The Development of 
European Law (1928); W. Kunkel, Das römische Recht am Vorabend der Rezeption, 
in L’Europa e il Diritto Romano. Studi in memoria di P. Koschaker I. 1-20 (1954); G. 
Ermini, Corso di diritto comune (19893); M. Bellomo, L’Europa del diritto commune 
(19947); A. Padoa-Schioppa, Il diritto nella storia d’Europa. Il medioevo (1995); P. 
Grossi, L’ordine giuridico medievale (19962).
18For the Humanist School, see H.D. Hazeltine, The Renaissance and the Laws of 
Europe (1926).; G. Kisch, Humanismus und Jurisprudenz (1955); D. Maffei, Gil inizi 
dell’umanesimo giuridico (1956); G. Kisch, Erasmus und die Jurisprudenz seiner 
Zeit (1960); H.E. Troje, Humanistische Jurisprudenz. Studien zur europäischen 
Rechtswissenschaft unter dem Einfluß des Humanismus (1993); H. Hübner, Jurisprudenz 
als Wissenschaft im Zeitalter des Humanismus, in Festschrift für K. Larenz zum 70. 
Geburtstag, at 41 et seq. (1973); P. Thomas, A Theoretical Foundation for Juridical 
Humanism, 16 Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte  (1994) at 2-10.
19For the significance of Roman law in the oeuvre of Budé, see M.L. Monheit, “Guillaume 
Budé, Andrea Alciato, Pierre de l’Estoile, Renaissance Interpreters of Roman Law, 
58 Journal of the History of Ideas, at 21-40 (1997).
20For the significance of the oeuvre of François Le Douaren or Franciscus Duarenus, 
see E. Jobbé- Duval, François Le Douaren (Duarenus), 1509-1559, in Mélanges P. F. 
Girard I. (1912 (reprint 1979), at 573-621 and W. Vogt, Franciscus Duarenus, 1509-
1559, sein didaktisches Reformprogramm und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung 
der Zivilrechtsdogmatik (1971).
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Jean de Coras (Corasius) (1515-1572),21 François Baudouin (Balduinus) 
(1520-1573),22 Hugo Doneau (Donellus) (1527-1591)23 and Loys Le Caron 
(Charondas) (1536-1614)24. 
Connan in his Commentariorum juris civilis libri X (1553) and Doneau 
in his Commentarii juris civilis (1587-1597) describe the legal system 
(ius civile) as arranged in a certain system. The purpose of the two legal 
scholars is a systematic description of the whole Corpus Juris Civilis. 
Apart from this systematisation, they fall short of drawing theoretical 
conclusions or setting up branches of law.25 That is a far cry from the 
Pandectist movement, though Friedrich Carl von Savigny and other 
German Pandectists respected it.
Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid, the famous work by 
Hugo Grotius (de Groot) (1583-1645), published in Dutch in 1631, more 
than ten years after it had been written and based on the system of 
Iustinian’s Institutiones, was a coursebook (tractatus) describing and 
analysing the private law of the province of Holland, which contained 
several elements and ideas of natural law. Regarding the systematic 
description of divisions of law, the relevant work by Grotius is De iure belli 
ac pacis libri tres, first published in Paris in 1625. Though it is a tractatus 
dealing mainly with natural law (ius naturale or ius naturae), Grotius 
offers an analysis of international law (ius gentium) in the modern sense 
and an analysis of several institutions of private and criminal law. In the 
second volume of that work (which was published in several editions) he 
separates law existing in the “world” (“magna generis humani societas”) 
into private and public law. That classification anticipates the modern 
division of legal systems.
In his work of basic significance, entitled Les loix (lois) civiles dans leur 
ordre naturel, le droit public et le legum delectus, Jean Domat (1625-1696) 
also provides an introduction to the legal system undoubtedly with an 
intent of classification. Domat, who cannot be treated merely as a kind 
of “French institutional writer,” complemented his work by writing four 
books on public law (droit public). Those latter works were published 
only posthumously in 1697. Domat uses the term ordre in the meaning 
of the Latin ordo, ars or systema. The term loix (lois) civiles means Roman 
law. The use of the term ordre naturel (in Latin: ordo naturalis) is a novelty 
in the title of Jean Domat’s work. Earlier representatives of Humanist 
jurisprudence did not use the term “naturel” (naturalis) in the text or 
title of their works.
F. THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY SCOTTISH 
INSTITUTIONAL WRITERS
In Scotland the authors of legal textbooks (institutional writers) were 
consistent in maintaining the unity of the legal system. In a similar 
way to English and other common law authors, Scottish writers of 
textbooks (manuals) present the legal system as an undivided unity 
or ‘seamless web’.
James Dalrymple (First Viscount Stair) (1619-1695), who is Lord President 
of the Scottish Court of Session (i.e. Supreme Court) from 1671, expounds 
Scottish civil law (which is based on Roman law) without dividing it 
into branches. His Institutions of the Law of Scotland was published 
first in 1681.
The work of Stair served as an example and basis for the work of Sir 
George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh (1636-1691), entitled Institutions of 
the Law of Scotland, which was published three years later in 1684. 
Mackenzie does not describe the Scottish legal system as divided into 
branches either. The same is true for the work of John Erskine of Carnock 
(1695-1768), published in 1754, in which the author takes the system 
of the work of Sir Mackenzie of Rosehaugh as its example.
It is worth mentioning that the works of the Scottish institutional 
writers are regarded as sources of law (fontes juris) by Scottish courts 
up until now.
G. THE QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
COMMON LAW JURISPRUDENCE
The renowned work of the first English institutional writer, Sir Henry 
Finch (1558-1625), Nomotechnia, published in England in 1613 (in 
French), has been largely used and it describes the whole legal system 
without any distinction between private and public law. In the first 
part of Nomotechnia, Finch deals with jurisprudence pointing out the 
difference between natural law and positive law (ius positivum). The 
second part of Nomotechnia provides an analysis of the questions of 
common law, customs, royal privileges, prerogatives and statute law. 
The third part deals with procedural law.26 The fourth part analyses 
the law on special jurisdictions, in particular the law of the Court of 
Admiralty and church courts. This work of Sir Henry Finch was published 
in an abridged English version under the title Law, or a Discourse thereof 
in Four Books in 1627, i.e. two years after his death. Nomotechnia is a 
thorough exposition of English common law and has been the basic 
source of learning of English law until it had been superseded by the 
works of William Blackstone and John Austin.
John Cowell (1554-1611), professor of civil law at Cambridge University, 
who described English law in his Institutiones juris Anglicani ad methodum 
et seriem Institutionum imperialium compositae et digestae, published 
in 1605, within the system exposed in the Institutiones of Iustinianus, 
made an attempt to construct a “bridge” between civil law and common 
law. Cowell makes no distinction between public law (ius publicum) 
and private law (ius privatum).
The first outstanding scholar of common law in modern times, Sir 
Matthew Hale (1609-1676), also considered Roman law suitable for 
systematizing English common law. In his An Analysis of the Laws, 
published in 1705, which to some extent follows the system exposed 
in Iustinian’s Institutiones, he did not separate public from private law 
similarly to Sir Robert Finch and John Cowell.
Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), the first Vinerian Professor of English 
law in Oxford (Pembroke College), who used a considerable amount 
of Sir Matthew Hale’s above-mentioned work, – described the English 
legal system in detail by providing historical background to various legal 
institutions in his four volume The Commentaries on the Laws of England.27 
The first volume of the Commentaries analyses the law on persons 
(Rights of Persons). The famous introductory part of this volume, Study 
Nature and Extent of the Laws of England, provides an analysis of special 
features of English law (and legal system). The second volume introduces 
property law (Rights of Things) in which law of property is explained 
with particular attention to law of immovable pieces of property (land 
law). The third volume (Of Private Wrongs) analyses wrongdoing against 
citizens and possibilities of their judicial remedy. In the fourth volume 
(Of Public Wrongs) Blackstone deals with various criminal offences and 
their punishment. At the end of that volume we can find a part entitled 
Rise, Progress and Gradual Improvements of the Laws of England, in which 
the author provides an overall picture of the historical development and 
formation of English legal system. The author of the Commentaries describes 
the institutions of both public and private law without differentiating 
between them. Blackstone does not consider public and private law as 
separate i.e. autonomous branches of law.28 
Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888), Regius Professor of Civil (Roman) 
law at Cambridge (Trinity Hall College), considered institutions of 
Roman law to be of fundamental significance in the comparative 
analysis of English law in his work Ancient Law: Its Connection with the 
Early History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Ideas, published in 
1861.29 As an adherent of the German Historical School (Historische 
Rechtsschule), Maine based jurisprudence on historical grounds. 
In Ancient Law Sir Henry Sumner Maine, as a pioneer of Historical 
Jurisprudence provides a historical overview of the development 
of law. In his view in early societies law gradually crystallizes from 
decisions into custom and then is formulated into early codes, of 
which – among orhers – the Twelve Tables are examples. Maine does 
not deem necessary to make a distinction between various parts 
(branches) of law, i.e. to make a division between public and private 
law within the legal system.
Frederic William Maitland (1850-1906), the creator of English legal 
history, professor at Cambridge, in his Constitutional History of England, 
which was published after his death in 1908, considered public law or 
constitutional law in many cases though not always as a kind of appendix 
to a basic institution of English law namely law of real property. As 
he put it: “Our whole constitutional law seems at times to be but on 
appendix to the law of real property”.30 Maitland does not consider 
constitutional law to be an autonomous branch of law when describing 
the English constitutional system.31 
Sir Thomas Erskine Holland (1835-1926), professor at Oxford, in his 
Elements of Jurisprudence, first published in 1880 and used as a textbook 
for half a century, emphasises the priority of private law. In his view 
private law is “the only typically perfect law”.32 The highlighting of the 
dominant role of private law, however, does not prevent the notable 
English jurist from appreciating the significance of public law, which 
is based on hierarchical relationships. In his view the separation of 
private and public law has merely a relative character.
Albert Venn Dicey (1835-1922), a highly reputed author on English 21The author of De iure civili in artem redigendo is Jean Coras. It forms a part of his 
work, entitled Tractatus universi juris.
22For the scholarly oeuvre of François Baudouin, see M. Turchetti, Concordanza o 
tolleranza. François Baudouin e i “moyenneur” (1984) and H.E. Troje, “Peccatum 
Triboniani”. Zur Dialektik der “interpretatio duplex” bei François Baudouin, 36 
Studia et Documenta Historiae et Juris  (1970), at 341-358.
23For the connection between Donellus and private law in the modern sense, see 
P. Stein, Donellus and the Origins of the Modern Civil Law, in Mélanges F. Wubbe 
439-452 (1993).
24For the connection between Loys Le Caron and French law (ius patrium), see G. 
Leyte, Charondas et le droit français, 39 DROITS  (2004), at 17-33.
25Grotius probably borrowed his idea of ‘universal law’ from Francisco de Vitoria 
(1483/93- 1546). Since it was Vitoria who wrote about “totus orbis aliquo est una 
republica”. See A. Eyffinger, Europe in the Balance, An Appraisal of the Westphalien 
System, 45 Netherlands International Law Review 186 (1998).
26Regarding the appreciation of the oeuvre of Sir Henry Finch, see F. H. Lawson, 
Institutes, in Festschrift für I. Zajtay – Mélanges en l’honneur d’I. Zajtay (1982), 
at 341 et seq.
27This work of Blackstone was thoroughly revised in 1841 and published with the title 
30F.W. Maitland, Constitutional History of England 538 (1908).
31This approach is reflected in the oeuvre of Maitland and others. The same is 
relevant to his work History of English Law, which he wrote as a co-author with 
Frederick Pollock, and which was first published in 1895. For the scholarly activity 
of Maitland, see H.A.L. Fisher, Frederic William Maitland (1910); T.F.T. Plucknett, 
Maitland’s View of Law and History, 67 The Law Quarterly Review  (1951), at 179-
194; H.E. Bell, Maitland (1965).
32Other significant works of Sir Thomas Erskine Holland are: Essay on Composition 
Deeds (1864) and Essays of the Form of the Law (1870). He was the editor of 
Justinianus’ Institutiones in English in 1873 (Institutes of Justinian). A significant 
part of his scholarly oeuvre is editing the works of great figures of international 
law. He published De Jure Belli by Gentili in 1877, Juris et Judicii Fecialis by Zouche 
in 1911 and De bello by Legnano in 1917.
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New Commentaries on the Laws of England. Another edition of the Commentaries 
came out as recently as the 20th century (lastly in 1938). For the significance of this 
work of Blackstone, see J. Clitherow, Preface to the Reports of William Blackstone 
(18282) and G. Jones, The Sovereignty of the Law (1973). Clitherow’s work provides 
a good overview on the sources of Blackstone’s principal work.
28In a shorter piece, published in 1756 with the title An Analysis of the Law of England, 
William Blackstone, in a similar way to the Commentaries, introduces English law 
according to its sources and not its classification (divisio).
29For the oeuvre of Maine in the Hungarian literature see G. Hamza, Sir Henry Maine 
et le droit comparé, 10 Orbis Iuris Romani  (2005), at 7-21.
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constitutional law emphasised the inseparability of constitutional law 
and private law in his works. Dicey is still a devotee of the necessity 
of maintaining the unity of the legal system even at the beginning of 
the 20th century.33 In his view the dividing of the legal system into 
subcategories is unnecessary and even dangerous.34 
Born in England, Sir John Salmond (1862-1924) moved to New Zealand 
at an early age. He was professor at the University of Adelaide and later at 
the Victoria University of Wellington. In his Jurisprudence, first published 
in 1902, and Torts, first published in 1907, he deals with New Zealand 
common law.35 In both of his works, similarly to the English authors 
mentioned above, he does not accept the distinction between private 
and public law. He stresses the advantages of a private law approach. 
Referring to Roman (Civil) law several times, his approach is similar to 
that of Ulpianus. In Salmond’s view public law covers mostly those rules 
and norms that relate to the organization and authority of the state, 
the rights due to the state and activity of the state in general.
H. THE QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
CONTINENTAL JURISPRUDENCE
In his work Pandectae Iustinianeae in novum ordinem redactae (1748-
1752) Robert-Joseph Pothier (1699-1772) describes the Pandects of 
emperor Iustinianus Ist in a ‘new’ rational and logical order (novus ordo), 
adapting them to the circumstances of his time.36 The highly esteemed 
professor of French law at the University of Orléans and holder of a 
number of honorary offices in the same town, whose oeuvre juridique 
was a significant contribution to the preparation of the French Code 
civil, described private law following the scheme of the Institutiones of 
Gaius and Iustinianus. In the description of the various legal institutions 
he further developed the concepts elaborated in the works of Gaius 
and the compilers of the codification of Iustinianus. He insisted fiercely 
on maintaining the unity of the legal system.The term Novus ordo did 
not mean that Pothier separated private law (droit privé) from public 
law (droit public) within the legal system.
Karl Friedrich Wilhelm Gerber (1823-1891), professor of the University 
of Erlangen, Tübingen and Leipzig, was an outstanding representative 
of the German Public Law Jurisprudence of the 19th century. In his 
exceptional Grundzüge eines Systems des deutschen Staatsrechts, published 
first in 1865, he dealt with public law by availing himself of categories 
and concepts of the Pandektensystem.37 In Berlin Gerber was a pupil 
of Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846). Puchta was considered as the 
most outstanding adherent of the German Historical School (Historische 
Rechtsschule) after Savigny. Gerber considered the state as a legal 
person in analogy with private law. He did not separate private from 
public law conceptually. His theory had great infl uence on outstanding 
representatives of German public law scholarship. In particular Paul 
Laband and partly Georg Jellinek were drawn to his ideas.
Paul Laband (1838-1918), professor at the University of Königsberg, 
and later of Strasbourg, described public law institutions of the German 
Empire (Deutsches Reich, “Wilhelminisches Reich”) with private law 
notions and categories in his three-volume work Das Staatsrecht des 
deutschen Reiches, first published between 1876 and 1882. Laband, 
who is considered as the founder of the trend of “Reichsstaatsrecht”, 
did not treat state law (Staatsrecht) as an autonomous branch of law 
(Rechtszweig). In his view strict separation of state law (public law) 
from private law is by no means practical. The serious counterargument 
against such distinction is firstly the private law origin of a number of 
public law institutions and secondly the striking similarity between the 
terminology and notions of the two branches of law.38 
In several works that are still quoted, Georg Jellinek (1851-1911), 
professor of the University of Vienna, Basel, then Heidelberg, did not 
deem it practical to divide the legal system. This view is in harmony 
with his idea related to the closed character of the legal system 
(Rechtsordnung). In his Allgemeine Staatslehre,39 first published in 1900, 
he did not separate the various branches of law from one another. 
In this approach the relationship between law (Recht) or state (Staat) 
and ethics does not play any role. The emphasis of the significance of 
private law theoretically may result from an ethical approach to law.40 
We refer here to the fact that Georg Jellinek formulated his view about 
law as an ethical minimum (ethisches Minimum) in this explicit form 
only in an early work (Die sozialethische Bedeutung von Recht, Unrecht 
und Strafe), published in 1878. In his seminal Allgemeine Staatslehre 
and its various later editions explaining his views on the state he did 
not emphasize that idea any more.
German authors of the second half of the 19th century and the first 
decades of the 20th century considered the difference between state 
law (public law) or constitutional law (Verfassungsrecht) and private law 
in that private law regulates the relationship between persons who 
are equal. According to their view public law is based on a hierarchical 
relationship pursuant to auctoritas of the state (Staat or Gemeinwesen). 
This authority (auctoritas) of the state, however, is no reason for the 
separation of public law (öffentliches Recht) and private law (Privatrecht) 
33See A.V. Dicey, The Development of Administrative Law in England, 31 Law Quarterly 
Review  (1915), at 148 .
34For the oeuvre of Albert Venn Dicey, see R.A. Cosgrove, The Rule of Law, Albert 
Venn Dicey. Victorian Jurist (1980).
35Sir John Salmond’s work, Jurisprudence, has been so far published in twelve editions 
(the most recent one in 1976); his other work Torts in eighteen editions (the most 
recent in 1981). Besides his activity as a university professor, his activity in public 
life is remarkable. In 1910, for instance, he was appointed Solicitor General of 
New Zealand.
36For the oeuvre in jurisprudence of Robert-Joseph Pothier, see P. Berhardeau, Vies, 
portraits et parallèles des jurisconsultes Domat, Furgole et Pothier (1789); P.A. 
Fenet, Pothier analysé dans ses rapports avec le Code Civil (1826); L.H. Dunoyer, 
Blackstone et Pothier (1827); L. Thezard, De l’infl uence des travaux de Pothier et 
du chancelier d’Aguesseau sur le droit civil moderne (1866); A. Piret, La rencontre 
chez Pothier des conceptions romaine et féodale de la propriété foncière. Diss. 
Paris (1937); U. Jahn, Die “subtilité du droit romain” bei Jean Domat und Robert-
Joseph Pothier. Diss. Frankfurt am Main (1971); H. J. König, Pothier und das römische 
Recht. Diss. Frankfurt am Main (1976).
37Gerber’s work, System des deutschen Privatrechts, was first published first 1848-
1849, and later in 17 editions, partly after the author’s death. It has outstanding 
significance in the field of private law. For the oeuvre of Gerber, see W. Wilhelm, 
Zur juristischen Methodenlehre im 19. Jahrhundert 88 (1958); P. von Oertzen, Die 
43E. Riezler, Oblitération des frontières entre le droit privé et le droit public, in Recueil 
d’Etudes  en l’honneur d’E. Lambert. Cinquième Partie – Le droit comparé comme 
science sociale (1938), at 17-136.
44For the political and public law changes following the era of the National Socialist 
takeover (Machtergreifung), see G. Hamza, Die Idee des „Dritten Reichs” im deutschen 
philosophischen und politischen Denken des 20. Jahrhunderts, 118 Zeitschrift 
der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Germanistische Abteilung) (2001), at 
321-336.
41Lehrbuch des Bürgerlichen Rechts was published first in 1900. The second edition, 
on which Enneccerus worked for three years, was published in two parts (Abteilung). 
The first part, published, in the year of the author’s death in 1928, deals with the 
Introduction and General Part (Einleitung. Allgemeiner Teil) of the German Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (BGB), the second part published a year earlier in 1927, deals with 
Contract Law Part (Recht der Schuldverhältnisse) of BGB. None of the editions of 
Lehrbuch des Bürgerlichen Rechts embraces the entire civil law or the complete 
material of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch because the introduction of property law, 
matrimonial law and the law of inheritance (law of successions) is missing.
42For the oeuvre of Nipperdey in jurisprudence and for its significance, see Th. Mayer-
Maly, Gedenkrede auf H. C. Nipperdey (1970); H. Stumpf, Hans Carl Nipperdey, 
in Juristen im Portrait. Festschrift zum 225 jährigen Jubiläum des Verlages C. H. 
Beck (1988), at 608 et seq. and K. Adomeit, Hans Carl Nipperdey als Anreger für 
eine Neubegründung des juristischen Denkens, 61 JuristenZeitung  (2006), at 
745-751.
from each other, i.e. the separation within the legal system. The spread 
of the idea of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) also played a certain role in it. 
According to the widespread view in the German public law dogma the 
essence of Rechtsstaat is closely related to self-restraint of the state.
One of the notable adherents of the 19th century Pandectist School, 
Ludwig Enneccerus (1843-1928) in his work Lehrbuch des Bürgerlichen 
Rechts, published in two editions,41 refers to the relative character of the 
distinction between private and public law. Enneccerus, who taught 
Roman law in Göttingen and Marburg, presented the first two volumes of 
the second draft (Zweiter Entwurf) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch) in the German National Assembly. His accomplishments 
are outstanding also for civil law codification in Germany. His view 
on the classification of the legal system deserves particular attention 
as well.
In the 20th century Hans Carl Nipperdey (1895-1968), a student of 
Lehmann and Hedemann, also emphasised the relative nature of the 
separation of public and private law.42 Nipperdey, who elaborated the 
doctrine of the Drittwirkung der Grundrechte i.e. the doctrine of the 
infl uence of the Constitution (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of 
Germany on the implementation of private law related rules, pointed to 
the relative character of such separation in his famous work: Grundrechte 
und Privatrecht, which was published in 1961.
According to Levin Goldschmidt (1829-1897), professor at Heidelberg, 
then Berlin, at least 17 theories are known to exist in relation to the 
separation between private and public law. In the opinion of Goldschmidt, 
who is regarded as the founder of the science of commercial law in the 
modern sense, the great number of frequently diametrically opposed 
theories per se point to the fact that separation of the two branches of 
law is extremely problematic.
Professor Erwin Riezler (1873-1953), in his study Oblitération des 
frontières entre le droit privé et le droit public,43 published in 1938, 
analyses the question of the separation of private and public law in 
20th century legal systems. He points out that in Germany after the 
National Socialists seized power,44 the politically infl uenced public 
law became prevailing. In his view the emphasis and particularly the 
exaggerated emphasis of the difference between the two branches of 
law in the past was inappropriate for both historical and legal doctrine 
related reasons. He considers, however, that the dominant theory, which 
makes no difference between public and private law at all in English 
jurisprudence, is anachronistic. He point out that public law must not 
be subordinated either to political or ideological considerations. This 
means that considerations of contemporary politics are not allowed 
to make an end to the unity of the legal system.
Léon Duguit (1859-1928), who is author, among other works, of the 
five-volume Traité de droit constitutionnel, is of the opinion that public 
law (droit public) cannot be treated as ‘perfect’ law, in other words, as 
area of law or branch of law. Therefore the correctness of the division 
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William Blackstone Karl Friedrich Wilhelm Gerber
soziale Funktion des staatsrechtlichen Positivismus 163 (1974) and M.G. Losano, Der 
Begriff ‘System’ bei Gerber, in Objektivierung des Rechtsdenkens. Gedächtnisschrift 
für I. Tammelo  (1984), at 647-665.
38Paul Laband was an excellent expert on Roman law and private law in his time. 
His name is connected e.g. with the separation of Vollmacht as an abstract fiction 
from mandate in the contractual representation. See P. Laband, Die Stellvertretung 
bei dem Abschluss von Rechstgeschäften nach dem Allgemeinen Deutschen 
Handelsgesetzbuche, 10 Zeitschrift für das gesammte Handelsrecht, at 184 et 
seq. (1866). See also, G. Hamza, Az ügyleti képviselet [Contractual Agency] 18-
20 (19972).
39Georg Jellinek’s work, Allgemeine Staatslehre, was published twice during his life 
and several times in unchanged editions after his death.
40For Jellinek’s concept on state, see R. Holubek, Allgemeine Staatslehre als empirische 
Wissenschaft. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel von Georg Jellinek (1961); I. Staff, 
Lehren vom Staat 291-306 (1981); M. Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts 
in Deutschland. Zweiter Band. Staatsrechtslehre und Verwaltungswissenschaft, 
1800-1914 (1992), at 450-455; and J. Kersten, Georg Jellinek und die klassische 
Staatslehre (2000).
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(dichotomy) between public and private law is highly disputed. According 
to Duguit, who follows the Greek-Roman model, a distinction between 
public and private law only has a classifying character.
Other French authors also highlight the relative nature of the difference 
between public and private law. The reason for this can be found in 
the different historical traditions and the special characteristics of the 
development of law. Raymond Guillien, a professor of the University of 
Lyon, finds it necessary to emphasise that no “demarcation line” can be 
found between droit public and droit privé. Consequently, the elimination 
of the difference between the two branches of law – at least in the second 
half of the 20th century – cannot be expected.45 From the point of view of 
the relationship between private and public law it is worth mentioning that 
in the field of legislation Section 6 of the Swiss Civil Code stipulates that 
federal private law does not limit the competence of the cantons in the 
area of public law.46 It would be inappropriate, however, to overemphasise 
the separation between private and public law solely on the basis of the 
section quoted above. This legislative provision deals exclusively with 
the competence of the cantons and the federal (central) state due to 
the federal (confederal) structure of the Switzerland.
The doctrinal problems of separating public and private law can be 
clearly seen in the French dominant doctrine under which the law of 
civil procedure (droit de procédure civile) in France is part of private law 
(droit privé). On the other hand the prevailing doctrine in Italy classifies 
the law of civil procedure (diritto di procedura civile) as a part of public 
law (diritto pubblico).
There is no doubt that the summa divisio between public and private 
law, the logical and dogmatic basis of which is more than doubtful, 
is not implemented uniformally in judicial practice in some countries 
of the European continent. As an example we can refer to the variety 
in the field of the implementation of law in the practice of the high 
courts in France. In this regard, in particular, it should be mentioned 
that, while the application of law by the Cour de Cassation is primarily 
based on private law, the implementation of law by the Conseil d’Etat 
is mainly based on public law.
I. CLASSIFICATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL 
EDUCATION AT FACULTIES OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND IN 
MODERN TIMES
The division of the legal system into branches of law played no role in 
the teaching of law either in the Middle Ages or in modern times.47 It is 
important to emphasise that the University of Halle (Alma mater Halensis), 
founded on 12 July 1694 by Frederick III Elector of Brandenburg, who 
became Emperor of Prussia (König in Preussen) in 1701 as Frederick I, was 
considered to be the most modern and prestigious German university 
at the time.
The University of Halle had such notable professors as Christian Thomasius 
(1655-1728), Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and Johann Gottlieb Heineccius 
(1681-1741). All of them are outstanding representatives of the School 
of Natural Law and early German Enlightenment. Christian Thomasius, 
who was forced to leave the University of Leipzig (which had been 
founded in 1409) in 1690, was considered as the ‘spiritual father’ of the 
University of Halle. It is primarily the merit of Thomasius that all faculties 
of the kurbrandenburgische Landesuniversität – the university was namely 
founded by Frederick III, Prince-elector (Kurfürst) of Brandenburg – 
became institutions in which reform ideas were prevailing. Moreover, 
we have to mention that Thomasius received a mandate in 1713 from 
the Frederick I, king in Prussia (König in Preussen), to start and complete 
the work of codification of law in the kingdom.
In spite of the fact that the University of Halle enjoyed an outstanding 
reputation throughout Europe and was considered to be an exemplary 
reform university (Reformuniversität), it did not mean any change in legal 
education. The four professors at the Faculty of Law of the University 
explained the legal system in a traditional scheme developed throughout 
the centuries. This scheme was characterised by the fact that law was 
taught following its sources (fontes juris) and not along the lines of 
its “branches”.48 This scheme was clearly refl ected in the structure of 
chairs (cathedrae) of the law school. In the year of the foundation of the 
university the following professorships were set up: Decretalis, Codex, 
Pandectae and Institutiones. In this regard we could refer to Erich Genzmer, 
the notable legal historian, who emphasised the importance of the 
structure of faculties of law in European universities in his work entitled 
Das römische Recht als Mitgestalter gemeineuropäischer Kultur.
J.  THE QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
LEGAL THEORY AND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
It has to be stressed that jurists (jurisperiti or jurisconsulti) of ancient 
Rome and of the Middle Ages had their own particular approach to 
law, which was different from the view of Hans Kelsen.49 One of the 
most important characteristics of Kelsen’s concept regarding law 
is that there is a close relationship between law (ius) and the state 
(res publica). Consequently, law and state are essentially inseparable 
categories and cannot be analysed separately. However, it is proper 
to say that the validity of the general rules of law does not directly 
depend on the decisions of the state (res publica). For the Romans the 
following issues belonged to the area of law: the customs of a legal 
community, resolutions passed by popular assemblies (comitia), legal 
acts issued by monarchs (kings and emperors), so-called ius positivum, 
and the legal principles (maxims) and ideas elaborated in the works 
of jurisconsults, chiefl y in their responsa. The latter, however, unlike 
the sources of law having the legal force by virtue of legislation, took 
effect imperio rationis rather than ratione imperii.
Anton Friedrich Iustus Thibaut (1772-1840)50 pointed out the aimlessness 
of the differentiation between public and private law in his essay Über 
unnöthige Unterscheidungen und Eintheilungen,51 published in 1798. 
The famous German legal scholar of Heidelberg did not deal with 
the question of separating public law (öffentliches Recht) and private 
law (Privatrecht), not even in his System des Pandekten-Rechts,52 first 
published in Jena in 1803. Thibaut’s concept deserves special attention 
also because he dealt with theoretical questions of law several times 
in his works.53 
Fritz Schulz (1879-1957)54 states in his work Prinzipien des römischen 
Rechts,55 published in 1934, that a kind of “imperialistic sense of mission” 
(Sendungsbewusstsein) was typical of the Romans. He based his view 
on the works of Cicero (first of all the theories set out in the dialogues 
De oratore and De re publica). Cicero emphasised that Rome, unlike 
other states in Antiquity, established both a legal system and a global 
empire. Schulz, who was professor of Roman law and civil law at the 
University of Innsbruck, Kiel, Göttingen, Bonn, Berlin and later on, after 
his emigration in 1939, in Oxford, did not deal in his above-mentioned 
work with the division of Roman legal system (ordo juris). The way he saw 
it, the Roman legal system remained in essence unchanged throughout 
the various periods of the development of the Roman state.56 
In the context of international (public) law we refer to the above-
mentioned Sir Henry Sumner Maine, who said that international law 
equals “private law writ large”. In his view the terminology of international 
law is historically based on private law related notions. That is why 
the renowned English legal scholar approaches several institutions of 
international law from the view of private law related institutions. Maine 
writes in his work Ancient Law, its Connection with the Early History of 
Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas as follows: “…there are entire 
departments of international jurisprudence which consist of the Roman 
law of Property.” Hence it follows that the doctrine of international 
law is closely connected with the Roman law of property, which is a 
basic institution of the Roman legal system.57 In Maine’s opinion, the 
separation of public law from private law is not practical in relation to 
international (public) law either.58 
Hersch Lauterpacht (1897-1960), in his famous work Private Law Sources 
and Analogies of International Law, published in 1927, emphasises 
the paramount role of private law and private law based analogies in 
international (public) law in the field of international arbitration. According 
45As the French legal scholar puts it, “La distinction du droit public et du droit privé 
n’est donc pas sûrement en voie de véritable disparition. Si elle ne comporte 
aucune ligne de démarcation, elle correspond à des élans juridiques bien distincts 
qui sont en lutte permanente [sic! G.H.]. Elle nous vient d’un immense héritage 
historique et juridique.” R. Guillien, Droit public et droit privé, in Mélanges offerts 
à J. Brethe de la Gressaye (1967), at 323.
461. Die Kantone werden in ihren öffentlich-rechtlichen Befugnissen durch das 
Bundeszivilrecht nicht beschränkt. 2. Sie können in den Schranken ihrer Hoheit 
den Verkehr mit gewissen Arten von Sachen beschränken oder untersagen oder 
die Rechtsgeschäfte über solche Sachen als ungültig bezeichnen.
47For the legal education method prevailing in the age of the Glossators, see P. 
Weimar, Die legistische Literatur und die Methode des Rechtsunterrichts der 
Glossatorenzeit, 2 Ius Commune (1969) at 47.
48E. Genzmer, Das römische Recht als Mitgestalter gemeineuropäischer Kultur, in 
Gegenwartsprobleme des internationalen Rechts und der Rechtsphilosophie. 
Festschrift für R. Laun zu seinem 70. Geburtstag 516 et seq. (1953).
49See H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1925). For Kelsen’s concept of state and law from 
recent literature, see H. Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie 
bei Hans Kelsen (19992).
50For the significance of Thibaut within German and European legal science, see H. 
Dorn, Die Rechtslehre von Anton Friedrich Iustus Thibaut. Diss. Tübingen (1958); 
H. Kiefner, Geschichte und Philosophie bei A.F.J. Thibaut. Diss. Munich (1959); 
H.-U. Stühler, Die Diskussion um die Erneuerung der Rechtswissenschaft von 
1780-1815 (1978) at 177-196; D. Tripp, Der Einfl uß des naturwissenschaftlichen, 
philosophischen und historischen Positivismus auf die deutsche Rechtslehre im 19 
Jahrhundert (1983) at 168-201; A Kitzler, Die Auslegungslehre des Anton Friedrich 
Iustus Thibaut (1986); R. Ogorek, Richterkönig oder Subsumtionsautomat? Zur 
Iustiztheorie im 19. Jahrhundert (1986), at 126-144; J. Rückert, Heidelberg um 1804 
56Fritz Schulz in his work History of Roman Legal Science published in 1946, 
which was also published in German in 1961 entitled Geschichte der römischen 
Rechtswissenschaft, took no notice of the problem of classification of Roman law. 
The same is true for his work Classical Roman Law, published in 1951.
57For the significance of Roman law in the scholarly oeuvre of Maine, see G. Hamza, 
Jogösszehasonlítás és az antik jogrendszerek [Comparative Law and Legal Systems of 
Antiquity] 48 (1998). Regarding Maine’s view on comparative law, see G. Hamza, Sir 
Henry Sumner Maine et le droit comparé, 10 Orbis Iuris Romani  (2005) at 7-21.
58Maine was not only a theoretician of law; he had close connection with politics 
and ius in praxi as well. Maine’s contact with legal practice is analysed in detail 
by G. Feaver, From Status to Contract. A Biography of Sir Henry Maine 1822-1888 
(1969), and R.C.J. Cocks, Sir Henry Maine. A Study in Victorian Jurisprudence  (1988) 
at 39-51.
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oder, die erfolgreiche Modernisierung der Jurisprudenz durch Thibaut, Savigny, 
Heise, Martin, Zachariä, in  Heidelberg im säkularen Umbruch  (1987) at 83-116; 
H. Hattenhauer, Anton Friedrich Iustus Thibaut und die Reinheit der Jurisprudenz, 
34 Heidelberger Jahrbücher  (1990) at 20-35.
51A.F.J. Thibaut, Über unnöthige Unterscheidungen und Eintheilungen, in Versuche 
über einzelne Teile der Theorie des Rechts, Vol. I. (1798), at 79. The two-volume 
Versuche über einzelne Teile der Theorie des Rechts (the second volume of which 
was first published in 1801) came out in second edition in 1817.
52System des Pandekten-Rechts served as a basis of teaching Roman law or heutiges 
römisches Recht at several German universities through decades. Its last, eighth 
edition was published in 1834.
53His most significant works on the questions of legal theory, apart from the above-
mentioned Versuche über einzelne Teile der Theorie des Rechts are: Juristische 
Enzyclopädie und Methodologie published in 1797 and Theorie der logischen 
Auslegung des Römischen Rechts first published in 1799 (second edition published 
in 1806).
54For the scholarly oeuvre of Fritz Schulz, see W. Flume, Fritz Schulz (1879-1957), 75 
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) 496-
507 (1958) and M. Bretone, Postulati e aporie nella ‘History’ di Schulz, in Festschrift 
für F. Wieacker zum 70. Geburtstag  (1978) at 37-49.
55This work of Fritz Schulz was published in English, Spanish and Italian 
translations.
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to Kelsen’s famous student, private law and private law analogies form 
sources of international (public) law. Hersch Lauterpacht, who was a 
student of Lord Arnold Duncan McNair in England, was a committed 
opponent of legal positivism.59 For him iustice (iustitia) and equity (aequitas) 
constitute to a great extent the pillars of the enforcement of law. This 
concept of Lauterpacht, which is rooted in an ideal perception of law, 
explains his emphasis on the outstanding role of private law among 
the sources of international (public) law.60 Stressing the dominant role 
of private law, therefore, makes the distinction between public law – 
in this case international (public) law – and private law relative. In the 
20th century and also in the first decade of 21st century, the problem 
of the classification of the legal system, often for political reasons, is 
connected to the question of public law attaining private law features, 
on the one hand, and private law attaining public law features, on 
the other.61 
K. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
We can draw the general conclusion that it would be inappropriate 
to identify the Roman term of ius publicum with the notion of public 
law in modern legal systems. The same is true for the Roman term of 
ius privatum which is by no means identical to the notion of private 
law in modern legal systems. The explanation for this difference is 
primarily to be found in the fact that these two “branches of law” were 
related to specific economic, social and legal circumstances in ancient 
Rome. In addition, we have to mention that in contemporary legal 
systems the state may be, with almost no limitation, party in a private 
law relationship having no hiererchical nature.
For instance, if damage is caused by state agencies, the aggrieved 
party may sue the state treasury (fiscus)). In contrast, in ancient Rome 
ius privatum based on the equal status of both parties of the legal 
dispute did not exist in general. This particular phenomenon was due 
to the fact that Roman citizens (cives Romani) were subordinated to the 
state (res publica) due to the basically hierarchical relationship between 
state and citizen.62 
Another example can be Roman “criminal law” (though no such 
branch of law was known to Romans). One of its areas, the so-called 
public offences (crimina or delicta publica) belonged to ius publicum, 
whereas the other sphere of Roman “criminal law”, the so-called private 
offences (delicta privata) belonged to ius privatum. Broad consensus 
has it that modern criminal law is part of public law governed by public 
law related principles.
Furthermore, in Roman law the rules of civil procedure – mainly in 
family and property affairs – form part of ius privatum. In modern legal 
systems, however, civil procedure belongs to public law (öffentliches 
Recht, public law, droit public, diritto pubblico, derecho público, direito 
público etc.) as interpreted broadly – except for the doctrine that is 
prevalent in France.63 
The above analysis makes clear that the idea of a division between public 
and private law in the modern sense was alien to Roman jurisprudence. 
In medieval jurisprudence the Glossators – Azo in particular – pointed 
out the disadvantages of the division of the legal system (ordo juris or 
systema juris). They claimed that “breaking down” the uniform legal 
system according to artificial criteria might detrimentally infl uence 
the interpretation of legal rules, their enforcement, and even the 
development of law in general. The classification of the legal system, 
into “branches of law” might evoke the danger of undermining the 
unity of the legal system. The Commentators, namely Bartolus, Baldus 
and Luca da Penne,64 paid particular attention to the problems arising 
from the division of the legal system. Analysing various institutions of 
ius publicum in their writings (tractatus) they did not consider public 
law as an autonomous branch of law. The fact that they explained 
and interpreted concepts and institutions of ius publicum by using 
the terminology of ius privatum may have played an important role 
in their approach.
The approach of Glossators characterises European jurisprudence 
both in the Middle Ages and in modern times.65 This statement is true 
in our view despite the fact that in common law jurisdiction(s) in recent 
decades, the opinion is gaining ground that the separation of public law 
from private law may be advantageous to the development of law.66 
59Hersch Lauterpacht explains his views on functions of international (public) law 
in The Function of Law in the International Community (1933).
60For the role of equity (aequitas, equity, Billigkeit, etc.) in the development of the 
legal system, see V. Miceli, Sul principio di equità, in Studi in onore di V. Scialoja II. 
(1905), at 84 et seq.; F. Pringsheim, jus aequum und jus strictum, 42 Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung) (1921) at 643-
668; M. Rümelin, Die Billigkeit im Recht (1921); E. Osilia, L’equità nel diritto privato 
(1923); C. Tobeñas, La Equidad y sus tipos históricos en la cultura occidental europea 
(1950); H. Mazeaud, “La notion de ‘droit’, de ‘justice’ et d’‘equité’”, in Aequitas und 
bona fides. Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag von A. Simonius  (1955) at 229-233; G. 
Alpa, Modern Equity (spunti sul nuovo significato di equity nella evoluzione attuale 
del Common law, in , L’Equità, Atti del VII Convegno di Studio organizzato dal 
Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale (1975) at 263 et seq.; M. Rotondi, 
Considerazioni sulla funzione dell’equità in un sistema di diritto positivo scritto, 
54 Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto  (1977) at 666; V. Piano Mortari, 
Aequitas e ius nell’umanesimo giuridico francese, in Atti della Accademia Nazionale 
dei Lincei Anno CCCXCIV – 1997. Classe di Scienze Morali Storiche e Filologiche 
Memoria Serie IX – volume IX – fasc. 2 (1997), at 143-279.
61From earlier literature, see H. Huber, Recht, Staat und Gesellschaft  (1954) at 32 et 
seq. More recently, Jean Carbonnier is justified writing about the growing role of 
ideology, which is a fact to be taken into account from the aspect of the division of 
the legal system. See J. Carbonnier, Droit et passion du droit sous la Ve République 
(1996) at 121 et seq. 
62For the specialization of Roman law based private law (ius privatum), see e.g. the 
study of Robert Feenstra. R. Feenstra, Dominium and ius in re aliena, the origins 
of a civil law distinction, in P. Birks (Ed.), New Perspectives in the Roman Law of 
Property. Essays for B. Nicholas (1989) at 111-112.
63In their textbooks renowned French civil law specialists e.g. Jean Carbonnier (1909-
2003), Phillippe Malaurie and François Terré handle the law of civil procedure (droit 
de procédure civile) as part of private law (droit civil).
64We refer here to the fact that the commentary written by Luca da Penne to the Tres 
libri was published in France only in 1509 in which the author uses the historico-
philological method contrary to the traditional dialectic-scholastic one.
65With regard to recent view about the distinction between private law and public 
law in German literature see the paper of Walter Leisner. W. Leisner, Unterscheidung 
zwischen privatem und öffentlichem Recht, 61 JuristenZeitung  (2006) at 869-
875 .
66In our view it is with no doubt a mistake to present public law without finding 
time to speak also about Roman public and private law. Such an error occurs, for 
instance, in the work of  Hermann Conrad, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (I-II. Karlsruhe, 
1962-1966) which is still occasionally quoted. In that book Conrad introduces the 
development of German public law without regard to its antecedents in Roman 
law and the relativity of the separation between public and private law.
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Монография посвящена конструкции экономических и социальных прав, принадлежащих 
гражданам третьих стран, в том числе гражданам Казахстана, в отношении их пребывания 
и работы, социального обеспечения, перемещения товаров и капитала, а также оказания 
услуг, на территории Европейского Союза. Указанные права принадлежат иностранным 
гражданам на основании международных договоров, заключенных Европейским Союзом 
с государствами, не являющимися членами данного интеграционного объединения. 
Проведенный на 356 страницах анализ норм международных договоров Европейского 
Союза, более 300 решений и заключений Суда Союза по различным делам, а также обширной 
научной литературы, позволяют сделать вывод о том, что некоторые конструктивные 
отличия норм международных договоров Союза не могут быть решающим фактором 
в отношении определения того, что единообразные элементы таких норм не могут 
иметь определенных системных взаимосвязей и создавать одни и те же правовые 
последствия. 
Таким образом, нормы международных договоров Европейского Союза могут быть 
истолкованы единообразно, даже в том случае, если положения таких договоров 
сформулированы различным способом. Принятие данного тезиса позволяет раскрыть 
«таинство» формулирования положений международных договоров Союза, их понимания 
и применения в правовых системах государств-членов Союза.
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доктор габор Хамза: рим құқығының дәстүрлері және қазіргі 
құқықтық жүйенің «тармақтарға» бөлінуі.
Зерттеудің авторы рим құқығының қазіргі мағынасын ашып көрсетеді. 
Римдік-құқық жүйесін топтастыру (divisio) идеясы ежелгі грек дәуіріндегі 
эллинистік ойлаудың философиясынан пайда болғандығын атап 
көрсетеді. Топтастыру немесе бөлімшелер (ius civile) құқықтың әр 
түрлі «тармақтарында», атап айтқанда азаматтық құқықта құқықтық 
тәртіптің қазіргі топтастырылуына байланысты емес екендігі ай-
тылады. Автор рим құқығы бүгінгі күні танылған жария және жеке 
құқықтың өз арасында бөлінуін мойындамайтынын дәлелдейді. Глосса-
тор Азоның мұндай бөлінудің қауіптілігіне назар аудара отырып, оның 
заңды дұрыс түсіндіре және дамыта алмайтындығына, нәтижесінде 
құқықтық жүйенің ыдырауының жағымсыз салдарына алып келеді деп 
санағанын атап өтеді.  
Түйінді сөздер: Азо, Балдус, Бартолус, Блэкстоун, Цицерон, Дайси, 
Домат, Дюги, Гербер, Еллинек, жеке құқық, жария құқық, Мэн, Лаутер-
пахт, summa divisio, Тибо, Ульпиан, жеке пайда, қоғамдық пайда.
доктор габор Хамза: традиции римского права и разделение 
на «ветви» современных правовых систем.
Автор исследования раскрывает современный смысл традиций рим-
ского права. Отмечается, что идея классификации (divisio) римско-
правовой системы возникла в древнегреческой период в филосо-
фии эллинистического мышления. Подчеркивается, что классифика-
ция или подразделение (ius civile) не связаны с современной класси-
фикацией правопорядка в различных «ветвях» права, в частности в 
гражданском праве. Автор доказывает, что римское право не при-
знало разделение между публичным и частным правом, как это при-
знано сегодня. Отмечается, что глоссатор Азо, обращал внимание на 
опасность  такого  разделения, полагая, что оно вряд ли  в состоянии 
адекватно интерпретировать и развивать закон, поскольку может вы-
звать негативные последствия распада правовой системы.
Ключевые слова: Азо, Балдус, Бартолус, Блэкстоун, Цицерон, Дай-
си, Домат, Дюги, Гербер, Еллинек, частное право, публичное право, 
Мэн, Лаутерпахт, summa divisio, Тибо, Ульпиан, частная выгода, об-
щественная польза.
